All judges are limited by the informational constraints imposed by the physical and contractual environment. Real actions, such as a trade of commodities, are assumed to be observed publicly. Therefore, if the original contract implements a real action, then this real action is verifiable by any supplementary judge. This facilitates side contracting (and makes it harder to implement the first best). There are two possible assumptions about collusive messages and side transfers: they might be public and hence verifiable by the original judge, or secret and unverifiable by the original judge. The first case is trivial, because it is easy for the original judge to punish collusion if he can verify what the colluding parties are doing. In effect, this case is equivalent to the polar case of no side contracting studied in classical mechanism design. To make the problem nontrivial, side contracting must take place behind closed doors, unobserved by the original judge. Since the grand coalition should be able to use the same contracting technology as any subcoalition, the grand coalition also can use secret messages and side payments. The supplementary judge (or arbitrator) cannot use cameras or microphones to monitor the original proceedings. (Alternatively, except for the real action, the inputs and outputs to one computer program cannot be direct inputs into the other.) The important implication is that messages and cash transfers exchanged under the original contract are not verifiable by a supplementary judge and hence not contractible for a subcoalition.
Even though a supplementary judge cannot directly monitor the original judge's proceedings, there are two ways for information to leak from the original contract to the side contract. First, the supplementary judge may try to infer the original messages or cash transfers by observing which real action the original judge ordered. Second, although the original messages and cash transfers are not verifiable by the supplementary judge, they are observed by the colluding parties (who, after all, participate in the original proceedings). The supplementary judge may use a message game to extract information about things that are observed by the colluding parties but not by the judge.
The first type of information leakage can be prevented by the original contract. It suffices to make sure the real action specified by the original mechanism does not reveal messages or transfers. Our paper will show that the second type of information leakage is not a problem either. To see this intuitively, suppose the builder and the third party conspire to make the architect pay a fine to the third party, which the third party is then supposed to share with the builder. The side contract has to provide incentives for the builder to send a message in the original mechanism which triggers the fine, and for the third party to share the fine with the builder. By assumption, the messages and transfers exchanged under the original contract are observed by the builder and the third party, but they are not verifiable to the supplementary judge. So, suppose the side contract specifies a message game, where the builder and the third party agree to tell the supplementary judge what happened when the Hart and Moore (1988) argue that it might be impossible to outlaw collusion even if the side contracting is publicly observed, because the side contract might be so complicated that an outsider cannot understand its true (collusive) meaning. In this case, a symmetric treatment of all coalitions requires that the grand coalition also has access to this kind of contracting technology. It must therefore be possible for the original judge's court hearings to be incomprehensible to outsiders. This is equivalent to the case we are considering, where all contracting (original or collusive) takes place behind closed doors, unobserved by outsiders.
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AEJ: Microeconomics original mechanism was played out. The supplementary judge then decides whether or not the third party should transfer a sum of money to the builder. However, the third party can always claim that the builder never sent the message, which would have triggered the fine, so no fine was paid. The supplementary judge has no direct knowledge of whether or not this is true because the original court proceedings took place behind closed doors. Moreover, since past messages and cash transfers are not "payoff relevant" (assuming quasi-linear utility functions), there is no way for the supplementary judge to extract the truth of the matter. The fact that the original messages and cash transfers are "observable but not verifiable" puts severe constraints on the side contract, and indeed makes it impossible to enforce an agreement whereby the builder and the third party share any fine paid by the architect to the third party.
In the terminology of the implementation literature, "full implementation" requires that there are no undesirable equilibrium outcomes. If, on the other hand, there are both desirable and undesirable equilibrium outcomes, then the mechanism "weakly implements" the desired outcome. When the original contract is designed, the main difficulty is to ensure the existence of an equilibrium which produces a first-best, efficient outcome. Consequently, we begin by studying weak implementation. Once weak implementation is accomplished, full implementation is easy to accomplish as well. Indeed, there are many ways to destroy undesirable equilibria. For example, suppose we want to rule out an undesirable equilibrium where the builder and the third party collude against the architect. In such an equilibrium, the architect knows that he is being conspired against and that his payoff is likely to be low. (Each player has "equilibrium knowledge," i.e., knows which equilibrium is played.) But it is easy to include a message ("blowing a whistle") that the architect prefers to send if (and only if) he knows that the others conspired against him, thereby destroying the bad equilibrium.
We model side contracting in a fully noncooperative way, and we do not allow "coalitional deviations" or "mergers" outside the formal moves of the game. The agents propose and accept side contracts as part of an extensive form game, and we investigate the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) of this game. In order to achieve weak implementation of the first-best outcome, we design an original mechanism which has an optimal PBE. No side contracting occurs along the equilibrium path. To support this PBE, we must ensure that, for any coalition and any side contract, there exists a continuation equilibrium 4 that would be bad for at least one member of the coalition. Suppose the builder and the third party can write a side contract that induces multiple continuation equilibria, one of which is bad for the builder. In the optimal PBE, if the third party were to propose this side contract, the builder would reject it, anticipating the outcome that is bad for him. Of course, the third party can propose any side contract, including complex contracts with integer games, etc. If he proposes a side contract that induces a unique continuation equilibrium, which is good for him and the builder, then the builder must accept it, and
AEJ: Microeconomics the optimal PBE would collapse. More generally, a side contract can threaten the optimal PBE if and only if all continuation equilibrium outcomes are good for all members of the coalition. We show that no such side contract exists if the original contract is well designed.
Formally, we will show that any side contract induces a continuation equilibrium where the messages sent to the supplementary judge about the original court proceedings are uninformative. This continuation equilibrium supports the optimal PBE. A collusive agreement could threaten the original contract only if it could be "fully implemented" in the sense that every continuation equilibrium is good for both colluding parties, but this is impossible. We stress that we are not arbitrarily introducing some kind of contracting asymmetry by requiring weak implementation for the grand coalition but full implementation for subcoalitions. It is an implication of the definition of PBE that a collusion-free PBE exists if every side contract induces at least one continuation equilibrium, which is bad for some colluding party. Also, although for convenience we begin by studying weak implementation for the grand coalition, we will show that it is easy to adjust the original mechanism to support full implementation.
In our buyer-seller model, the first best can be implemented by an original mechanism that always recommends the same real action (i.e., the same trade), regardless of the messages. It is impossible for a subcoalition to implement fully a collusive agreement of the form: "if the third party receives a fine, he will share it with his coalition partner." For any side contract, there will exist a continuation equilibrium where the third party makes the same transfer to his coalition partner regardless of what happened in the original mechanism. But this only adds or subtracts a constant from the payoffs and does not affect marginal incentives within the original mechanism. It does not threaten the optimal PBE. Since the first best is implemented, there is no inefficiency caused by holdup.
In the moral hazard in teams model, the total output is a "real" amount of goods produced. This is verifiable for any judge. Unlike Holmström (1982) , we assume side contracting is possible. 5 The third party supplies no effort but acts as a budget breaker. A side contract can require the third party to make a transfer to a colluding team member as a function of the (verifiable) output of the team.
6 Such a side contract does affect the team member's incentives in the original mechanism and may potentially upset an optimal PBE. Indeed, we show that if the original contract does not specify a message game, then the budget breaker is redundant. This captures Eswaran and Kotwal's (1984) and Hart and Moore's (1988) insight-the budget breaker and one of the original agents will collude, so it is useless to include a budget breaker in the original contract. But this insight only applies to original 5 Mukesh Eswaran and Ashok Y. Kotwal (1984) introduce side contracting into Holmström's team model. Sandro Brusco (1997) looks at side contracting in a model where the team members can observe each others' effort levels. 6 Since individual effort is unobserved, unlike in the buyer-seller model, there is nothing special about the number two. Implementation of the first best is difficult even when the team has three or more members. As Holmström (1982) showed, big teams can also benefit from a third party (i.e., an outside budget breaker who is not a team member). To maintain symmetry with the buyer-seller model, we assume the team has only two members, but our results apply for bigger teams as well.
AEJ: Microeconomics contracts without message games. We will show that if a message game is included in the original contract, then a third party is valuable. We construct an original mechanism with a "whistle-blowing" clause, where the third party reveals any collusive activity he knows about. The original contract will not reveal whether the third party blew the whistle or not, i.e., whistle-blowing will not be verifiable information for a supplementary judge. We show that for any collusive coalition which includes the third party, there is always a continuation equilibrium where the third party blows the whistle in front of the original judge. The original judge then punishes the other coalition member, who therefore does not want to collude in the first place.
Even though the team members cannot observe each other's effort, a message game is necessary for weak implementation of the first best. This seems to contradict the "revelation principle"-if effort is unobserved, what is there to send messages about? In the presence of side contracting, however, the revelation principle cannot be interpreted to mean that the agents should reveal what they know about effort levels. They should also reveal what they know about collusion (by blowing the whistle). Leonardo Felli (1996) makes a similar point with respect to Tirole's (1986) principal-supervisor-agent model.
Our buyer-seller model is similar to Segal and Michael D. Whinston (2002) , and encompasses models that have used Eric S. Maskin and Moore's (1999) implementation with renegotiation paradigm to provide "foundations for incomplete contracts." For example, in Che and Hausch (1999) , traders make cooperative investments and decide what quantity to trade. The first best cannot always be achieved, but the second best can be implemented without any explicit contract. In Segal (1999) , traders make selfish investments and n possible goods can be traded (see also Tirole 1999 and Hart and . Under some assumptions, as n becomes large, the first best cannot be achieved, and the second best can be implemented without any explicit contract. These results are important theoretical foundations for incomplete contracts. We show that implementation of the first best can be achieved by including a third party, even if agents can side contract and renegotiate inefficient outcomes.
In some models of bilateral holdup with renegotiation, the first best can be implemented even without a third party. Che and József Sákovics (2004) consider a dynamic model where the timing of investment is endogenous. They show that the hold-up problem can be resolved, even with no contract, if the buyer and seller are sufficiently patient. Philippe Aghion, Mathias Dewatripont, and Patrick Rey (1994) ; Georg Nöldeke and Klaus M. Schmidt (1995) ; and Aaron S. Edlin and Stefan Reichelstein (1996) also found positive results for the bilateral case. Joel Watson (2007) has shown that the extent of the hold-up problem depends on the technological details of renegotiation. He argues that if the decision to take a verifiable action lies in the hands of individuals rather than an outside enforcer, it may be possible to implement a larger set of state-contingent payoffs. All these results complement ours by clarifying the extent to which the hold-up problem can be resolved even in the absence of a third party.
We now turn to the results. Section I contains the buyer-seller model with a third party. Section II studies the moral hazard in teams model. Section III concludes. 
A. The Buyer-seller Relationship
There is a buyer B and a seller s. Let b $ 0 denote a relationship-specific investment made by the buyer, and let s $ 0 denote a relationship-specific investment made by the seller. Let v [ V denote a random variable which is realized after investments are made. The buyer's realized cost of making investment b is w B 1b, v 2 , and the seller's realized cost of making investment s is w s 1s, v 2. The vector u 5 1b, s, v 2 is the state of the world. We make the standard assumption that u is observed by B and s but by no one else.
Trade between the buyer and seller is represented by a set of possible real actions denoted by X. 
The seller's expected payoff is
B. The Third Party
A third party T may be invited to play the role of budget breaker in the buyerseller relationship. Thus, there are three players: B, s, and T. The third party cares only about money (not about x or u), and his payoff is linear in wealth. He does not observe u.
C. Time Line
The relationship between B, s, and T is governed by an original contract that specifies an original mechanism G 0 . A mechanism is a message game, which specifies message spaces, and an outcome function, which maps messages into outcomes. 7 We do not model the bargaining process, which produces G 0 . We simply assume that at the beginning of the game that G 0 has already been determined. The extensive form game g 1G 0 2 , induced by G 0 , is described by the following time line.
At time 0, there is a coalition-formation game with two stages. In the first stage, T can propose a side contract to B or s (but not to both).
8 A proposal to player j [ 5B, s6 is an invitation to form a two-player coalition, c 5 5 j, T 6. The proposal specifies a set of "side-contracting mechanisms," 5G c 1x2 6 x[X .
9 As the notation suggests, we allow the side-contracting mechanism to depend directly on x, the action implemented by the original mechanism, because x is verifiable. At time 0, the coalition does not know what real action will be implemented by G 0 , so they write a contingent side contract of the form "if G 0 produces the outcome x, then the coalition will play message game G c 1x2 at time 4." 7 We restrict attention to normal form mechanisms. Allowing the agents to send messages sequentially would not change any results. 8 It is evident that side contracting between B and s will not be a problem. Therefore, allowing B and s to make proposals would not change anything. 9 The only restriction we put on the set of possible side contracts is that they be regular enough that a continuation equilibrium exists. If the strategy space in a side-contracting mechanism is an open set, for example, no continuation equilibrium may exist. Presumably, the supplementary judge would not tolerate it. Formally, we assume T can only propose side contracts with the best-response property. Each player will aways have a best response to any strategy chosen by his opponents.
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If T does not make any proposal in the first stage, then we bypass the second stage and proceed to time 1. If T makes a proposal to player j [ 5B, s6 in the first stage, then in the second stage player j responds to T by either accepting or rejecting the proposal. If player j accepts, then coalition 5 j, T 6 has formed, and the side contract is in force. If j rejects (or no proposal was made in stage one), then no coalition is formed.
Side contracting is done secretly. Thus, if T proposes a coalition 5B, T 6, then s is not informed about this (neither is s informed about B's decision to accept or reject the proposal). Similarly, B is never told about any side contract between T and s. Consequently, if a two-person coalition forms, then the party who is left out is not informed about this and cannot react to it in any way.
At time 1, the buyer and the seller make investments b $ 0 and s $ 0, respectively. The buyer observes the seller's investment s, and the seller observes the buyer's investment b, but no one else observes b or s.
At time 2, the random variable v [ V is realized. The realization of v is observed by the buyer and the seller but not by anyone else.
At time , the original mechanism G 0 is played out among the original parties. The mechanism specifies a message space m i for each player i [ 5B, s, T 6. For each message profile m [ m B 3 m s 3 m T , the mechanism produces an outcome of the form 1x 1m 2 , t 1m 2 2. Here, x 1m 2 [ X is a real action ordered by the original judge, and t 1m 2 5 1t B 1m 2 , t s 1m 2 , t T 1m 2 2 [ R is a vector of monetary payments, where t i 1m 2 is a transfer to player i. We require t B 1m 2 1 t s 1m 2 1 t T 1m 2 5 0 for all m. Thus, the budget must always balance. The original judge cannot destroy wealth, only reallocate it among the three parties.
At time 4, nothing happens if no coalition was formed at time 0. However, if a coalition c was formed, then the side-contracting mechanism G c 1x2 is played out among the coalition (where x 5 x 1m 2 is the real decision determined by the messages m at time ). The side-contracting mechanism G c 1x2 specifies a message space If there is strict inequality, then the supplementary judge in effect destroys wealth (see the discussion below). The sidecontracting mechanism G c 1x2 cannot specify a different real action than the original mechanism. Any attempt to overrule the original contract by choosing a different x would constitute a violation of the original contract, which we assume can be ruled out by the original judge. Indeed, since the physical transaction x directly involves B and s (but not T ), a coalition that excludes either B or s clearly cannot have any right to choose x.
10 However, the side-contracting mechanism can specify cash transfers among the coalition because these are not publicly observable.
10 If the real action ordered by the supplementary judge is publicly observable, then by definition is it verifiable and can be ruled out by the original contract. On the other hand, to assume a supplementary judge could "secretly order" a real action would have absurd consequences. To be specific, suppose the judge supervising a secret, collusive agreement between B and T orders a "secret trade" between B and s. That means s will receive an order to secretly deliver some goods to B signed by a judge he never heard of. We assume that, since s is not a part of the collusive agreement-indeed it is directed against him-he has no obligation to obey this order. That At time 5, B and s may renegotiate the decision x 5 x 1m 2 produced by G 0 at time . The renegotiation takes place in secret and cannot be observed by anyone except B and s.
11 With probability l B , the buyer makes a take-it-or leave-it proposal consisting of a new decision, x R [ X, and a pair of transfers 1t B R , t s R 2 (which are added to any previous transfers the players have received). We require t B R 1 t s R 5 0. If the seller accepts, the proposal is implemented. If the seller rejects, there is no renegotiation and the game ends. With probability l s 5 1 2 l B , it is the seller who makes a takeit-or leave-it proposal. If the buyer accepts, the proposal is implemented. If the buyer rejects, there is no renegotiation and the game ends. Our results are not sensitive to the precise specification of the renegotiation game. Any reasonable specification (e.g., alternating-offer bargaining) would lead to the same results.
D. The Renegotiated outcome
The game g 1G 0 2 is solved backwards. Suppose time 5 has been reached and consider the continuation equilibrium of the renegotiation stage. The true state of the world u 5 1b, s, v 2 is known to B and s. The mechanism G 0 has recommended the real decision x 5 x 1m 2 at time . 
In the continuation equilibrium, the renegotiated outcome x R will maximize ex post surplus, i.e., x R 5 x * 1u2. Whichever party makes the take-it-or-leave-it offer will appropriate all the surplus. If B makes the proposal, he will make sure that s is indifferent between accepting and rejecting the proposal. In order to convince s to switch from x to x * 1u2 , s will be compensated by the amount t s R 5 c * 1u2 2 c 1x, u2. Conversely, if s makes the proposal, then B will be compensated by the amount t B R 5 v 1x, u2 2 v * 1u2. Given state u, real decision x as recommended by G 0 , and the pair of transfers 1t B , t s 2 , we can now calculate the buyer's expected payoff, taking renegotiation into account, but not including the cost of the investment. It is
is, a judge has no jurisdiction over agents other than those who signed the agreement he supervises. Otherwise, B and T could sign an absurd agreement that would force s to hand over everything he owns. 11 If renegotiation is public, then the original contract can forbid it and use inefficient punishments to support a truthful equilibrium. Then, a third party would not be necessary to achieve first best.
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Similarly, the seller's expected payoff is
Since we know what will happen at time 5, we will suppress the renegotiation stage in what follows. Thus, if there is no side contract in force and the messagegame form G 0 produces the outcome 1x 1m 2 , t B 1m 2 , t s 1m 2 , t T 1m 2 2 at time 4, then the buyer's final payoff will be u B 1x 1m 2 , t B 1m 2 , u2 , as defined by (2). The seller's final payoff will be u s 1x 1m 2 , t s 1m 2 , u2 , as defined by (). The third party's payoff will be t T 1m 2. If there is a side contract in force, then the transfers 1t i c 2 i[c are added to the payoffs in the obvious way, according to (1).
E. Participation constraints
The buyer and seller may have the option of not trading. To formalize this, let G 0 * denote a "null" mechanism that simply recommends the outcome x~ and no transfers (there are no messages). Of course, the outcome x~ will be renegotiated at time 5. The payoffs in state 1b, s, v 2 will be
for the buyer and (5) u s 1x~, 0, 1b, s, v 2 2 2 w s 1s, v 2 for the seller, using the definitions in (2) and (). Under the null contract, the buyer will set b to maximize the expectation of (4) with respect to v, taking s as given. The seller will set s to maximize the expectation of (5) with respect to v, taking b as given. Let b and ŝ denote the equilibrium investments. In general, these investments will not be at the efficient level, 1b , ŝ2 Z 1b
The expected payoffs from the equilibrium induced by the null mechanism G 0 * are
and (7) s~ ; E v 5u s 1x~, 0, 1b , ŝ, v 2 2 2 w s 1ŝ, v 2 6.
Of course, with the null contract, the third party plays no role and gets zero payoff.
The participation constraints will ensure that both B and s are better off than under the null contract. It is useful to define a pair of transfers 1t B (8) and (9) guarantee that the buyer's and the seller's participation constraints are satisfied. That is, they are better off than they would be under the null contract.
F. discussion
As mentioned above, a reasonable starting point for the analysis of side contracting is the symmetry assumption that the grand coalition and all subcoalitions have access to the same contracting technology. In our model, however, we have made two assumptions that give two-player subcoalitions a slight contracting advantage: (a) subcoalitions can destroy wealth, but the grand coalition cannot; (b) there is only one round of side contracting, so a subcoalition does not have to worry about making the side contract robust against further deviations. We will show that the first best can be implemented, even though two-player subcoalitions have this contracting advantage over the grand coalition. Of course, the first-best can also be implemented if this advantage is removed. Thus, the first best can be implemented if the symmetry assumption holds. Indeed, by giving subcoalitions a slight contracting edge, we strengthen our result that the first best can be implemented.
The assumption that subcoalitions can destroy wealth implies that a side-contracting mechanism can have a "truthful" equilibrium, where the colluding parties reveal what happened during the original proceedings, in addition to many untruthful equilibria. Truth-telling is enforced by the threat that the supplementary judge will punish both colluding parties (by destroying wealth) if they disagree with each other. As is well known, such truthful equilibria typically exist when both parties have the same (unverifiable) information and ex post inefficient punishments are feasible. If we had ruled out ex post inefficient punishments in side contracts, then the truthful equilibrium would not exist, and the difficulties of side contracting would have been revealed even more starkly. The model would have become less tractable, however, because if a two-agent coalition could not destroy wealth then it might benefit from an outside budget breaker (for the same reason that a third party is used in the original contract). Enlisting such a "fourth party" would open up further possibilities for side contracting, and the second assumption (that there is only one round of subcontracting) would have to be dropped. The analysis would become quite complicated. Our assumption that subcoalitions can use ex post inefficient punishments means they have no need for a budget breaker. But in the original contract, we do not allow any kind of ex post inefficiency such as the destruction of wealth. Despite this handicap, the original contract will implement the first best.
We now further discuss our assumptions about observability and verifiability. First, we make the standard assumption that the state is observed by the buyer and the seller, but unobservable (and hence unverifiable) to outsiders, including the third party and all judges.
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AEJ: Microeconomics Second, we assume coalitions can form secretly. Thus, the original contract cannot simply outlaw coalition formation. Maskin and Tirole (1999) suggest that the original contract might reward any agent who produces evidence of a side contract (and the original contract will punish the other members of the coalition). We assume hard evidence about side contracts is impossible to produce, otherwise it would be too easy to implement the first best (by simply outlawing side contracting). Any member of a coalition will have "soft" information about the side contract, however, and can be asked to reveal it ("whistle-blowing"). Thus, at time a "revelation mechanism" should not just collect reports about the state of the world, but also about side contracts. (It turns out that whistle-blowing is useful in the team model, but not in the buyer-seller model).
Third, what goes on behind the closed doors of a judge (messages and cash payments) cannot be observed by outsiders. This assumption is needed to make side contracting possible. Indeed, if the original judge could observe the supplementary judge's court proceedings, then side contracts would be verifiable information, and so the original judge could outlaw them. Since the original judge should be able to use the same contracting technology as any supplementary judge, the original mechanism can also be played out behind closed doors. In other words, since the original judge does not have any microphone installed in the supplementary judge's court room, then the supplementary judge cannot have a microphone installed in the original judge's court room. 12 In general, the outcome of a contract cannot depend directly on messages or cash transfers exchanged under another contract (but perhaps indirectly, via message games).
Fourth, we assume that the real decision x produced by G 0 at time is publicly observable, hence verifiable by any judge. The real decision x has a physical manifestation outside the court room, so unlike messages and monetary transfers, it is impossible to keep x secret. For example, the original judge may order the seller to deliver a certain quantity of goods to the buyer. This physical action cannot take place in secret. This helps the agents side contract, because any coalition can make its agreement conditional on x.
Fifth, we make the standard assumption that renegotiation at time 5 is unverifiable. If renegotiation is verifiable, then the original mechanism can prescribe that large payments be made by B and s to T, should the final decision x9 differ from the decision x prescribed by the original contract. Maskin and Tirole (1999) suggest that the original contract might reward any agent who produces evidence of renegotiation (and the contract will punish the others who participated in the renegotiation).
1
With such a scheme, even if renegotiation occurs, some of the surplus generated 12 If agent i gives cash to the judge, who transfers it to agent j, neither agent will have any proof that the transaction took place. The judge does not give out any receipts (he is incorruptible so no receipts are necessary). A bank statement showing agent i has withdrawn cash from his account does not reveal what happened to the money. Even if the mechanism is a computer program, it automatically can open a new bank account in agent j's name and deposit money in it. It would be impossible for agent j to prove he did not receive money in this way. Notice that this scheme makes it possible to secretly reward whistle-blowers.
1 A difficult situation occurs if a new, renegotiated contract surfaces that contradicts the original contract. Suppose the new contract is signed by B, T, and s and contains a clause invalidating G 0 . It is not clear which contract would in fact be enforced. If the new contract has precedence, then renegotiation cannot be eliminated by G 0 in the way Maskin and Tirole suggest.
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AEJ: Microeconomics by it might go to T, so renegotiation might be costly for B and s. By adding more and more parties to the contract, the share of the surplus going to B and s might be lowered even further. We assume evidence of renegotiation is impossible to produce, however, so renegotiation is impossible to rule out in the original contract.
14 This assumption makes it more difficult to design G 0 to implement efficient outcomes.
Given our assumptions, a side contract for coalition c can specify transfers as a function of the decision x ordered by the original judge and the messages sent in the side-contracting mechanism. This might indirectly influence which decision x is implemented by the original contract. For example, a badly designed original contract might specify that if B says the quality of the good is low then the outcome is x~ and s pays a fine to T, but otherwise they trade a positive amount. Now B and T can agree secretly that B should always report that the quality is low and split the fine with T. The side contract can enforce this by specifying that, if the outcome produced by the original mechanism is anything else than x~, then B pays a large fine to T. Of course, a well designed original contract would not reveal the messages in this blatant way. But the colluding coalition might try to use a message game to elicit information about the messages sent in the original mechanism. That is, the supplementary judge could ask B and T about what B told the original judge.
G. Implementation
We will design an original mechanism G 0 and construct an equilibrium of g 1G 0 2 , where no coalition forms along the equilibrium path and produces the first-best solution. In this section, we will not worry about the possible existence of other, nonoptimal, equilibria. Thus, this section deals with "weak" implementation of the first best.
In order to support an equilibrium with no side contract in force, T should not have any incentive to try to form a coalition at time 0. To ensure this, we need to show that for any coalition, there exists a continuation equilibrium that is bad for at least one of the members of the coalition. That is, for any possible side-contract proposal T could make to player j [ 5B, s6, either the proposal makes player j worse off, so he will reject it, or T is made worse off, so he does not want to make the proposal in the first place.
We now define the original mechanism G 0 that is played out at time . This particular mechanism will be called the secret message mechanism. In the secret message mechanism, the buyer and the seller announce the state simultaneously. Formally, player i [ 5B, s6 sends a message u i from the message space m i ; Q. The third party sends no message. To ensure that the participation constraints are satisfied, the pair of transfers 1t B * , t s * 2 satisfy (8) and (9) Although the messages are observed by B, s, and T, they are not verifiable by outsiders. The no-trade outcome is always implemented to avoid signaling the message profile indirectly. We will show that a side contract cannot elicit information about the original messages, so there is no way to collude profitably. The equilibrium is first best, because the no-trade outcome is renegotiated to the efficient decision in every state, and transfers are designed to give efficient incentives. To prove the theorem, we construct a PBE of g 1G 0 2 as follows. At time 0, no side contract is proposed. If the players have not joined any coalition at time 0, then they play as follows from time 1 on. The buyer and seller invest at the firstbest level at time 1, and at time they tell the truth (in all states of the world). If, at time , either the buyer or the seller deviates and lies about the state, then they incur the fine F 2 by Rule 2. If F 2 is large enough, neither the buyer nor the seller has an incentive to deviate from truth-telling. Furthermore, if F 1 is sufficiently big, then Rule 1 implies that both agents prefer to choose the first-best investment levels, anticipating that the truth is revealed at time . From this it follows that, if there is no side contract at time 0, then the proposed strategies are sequentially rational from time 1 on. The outcome is first best by construction, and the equilibrium payoffs are B It remains to specify behavior after a time 0 deviation, where T proposes a side contract. To support the equilibrium such a deviation should not be profitable. To be specific, suppose T proposes a side contract to B (the argument concerning a proposal to s will be exactly the same). We construct the strategies so that if B accepts and coalition c 5 5B, T 6 forms, then either B or T will get no more than their equilibrium payoff. If T gets no more than zero, it is certainly not profitable for him to propose the coalition. If B gets no more than B * 1t B * 2 by joining the coalition, then we stipulate that his equilibrium strategy is to reject the proposal, and this behavior is certainly sequentially rational. Knowing that B will reject, it is again not profitable for T to make the proposal.
So suppose B accepts. The coalition c 5 5B, T 6 forms and a side contract 5G c 1x2 6 x[X is in force. s is unaware of the side contract and will play as described
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The buyer and the third party would jointly benefit if they could enforce the following side contract: "The third party pays the buyer 2F 2 2 e at time 4 if and only if the buyer contradicted the seller at time ." But this is not an enforceable side contract, because messages in G 0 are not verifiable by the supplementary judge, and the real action is always x~. Moreover, a message game in the side contract cannot elicit information about messages sent in G 0 . With quasi-linear utilities, previous transfers are payoff irrelevant, so there is always an uninformative continuation equilibrium where the time 4 messages are independent of what happened at time . But then, B may as well tell the truth at time , to avoid paying an extra fine to T.
We offer three further comments on Theorem 1. First, one cannot eliminate the "uninformative" continuation equilibrium by appealing to some refinement of Nash equilibrium, such as undominated Nash equilibrium (Thomas R. Palfrey and Sanjay Srivastava 1991), or even by relying on virtual implementation (Dilip Abreu and Arunava Sen 1991 and Hitoshi Matsushima 1988) . The reason is that a "preference reversal" condition would still be necessary. If the continuation equilibria are to differ across two histories of play, there must be
FORTHCOMING ( NOT FINAL )
AEJ: Microeconomics some agent whose preferences over two outcomes reverse (see Maskin and Sjöström 200, Sections 4.1 and 4.2 for details). But, as we have stressed, the time transfers are payoff irrelevant at time 4. Hence, there is no preference reversal. In our model, coalition formation is fully noncooperative, so the only way for a coalition to ensure a profitable deviation is to design a side contract which fully implements it. Theorem 1 shows that this is impossible.
Second, like most of the literature, we assume B and s are risk neutral. However, suppose that they have strictly concave von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. If the degree of risk aversion varies with wealth, and if a coalition can implement lotteries in the side contract played at time 4, then previous transfers become payoff relevant. At time 4, a lottery mechanism might extract indirect information about previous transfers, and enforce nontrivial side payments. However, if such lottery mechanisms can be part of a side contract, then they can also be part of the original contract, and the buyer and seller can implement the first best even without the help of a third party (see Maskin and Moore 1999) . On the other hand, Hart and Moore (1999) argued that lottery mechanisms are impractical. In this case, the first best can be implemented with the help of a third party, by using the secret message mechanism described above, because a coalition cannot use a lottery mechanism in a side contract to extract information about what happened at time .
Third, we have assumed that the set of possible real actions X is describable ex ante. If parts of it are indescribable, it is impossible to write an original contract that fully identifies which action to implement. Indeed, the typical assumption in the incomplete contracts literature is that some actions, such as asset ownership, are always describable. Others, such as which object to trade, are indescribable ex ante but describable ex post (e.g., Sanford J. Grossman and Hart 1986 , Hart and Moore 1990 , and Hart 1995 . The indescribability may be pertinent as it may be optimal to trade different objects in different states of the world. However, as Maskin and Tirole (1999) argued, there is a tension between the assumption that certain actions are indescribable ex ante and the assumption that agents are able to perform dynamic programming. Maskin and Tirole's (1999) Theorem 4 shows that a contract that is implementable (with renegotiation) when actions are describable is also implementable (with renegotiation) when they are indescribable. In this sense, indescribability is irrelevant and the only binding constraints are those imposed by renegotiation. Thus, even if actions are indescribable, Maskin and Tirole's (1999) irrelevance theorem, together with the results of our paper, implies that a third party contract can implement the first best.
H. Full Implementation
Although, for convenience, we began by studying weak implementation, there are various ways to make sure all PBE produce the first-best outcome (see Palfrey and Srivastava 1991 for a guide to the literature on full implementation). One simple way is to amend the time line in Section C by allowing B and s to send messages at the very beginning of the game, just before time 0. We call this time 21. The announcements at time 21 will decide whether the mechanism played at time will be the secret message mechanism described in Section G or the null mechanism G 0 *
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AEJ: Microeconomics described in Section E. (Recall that G 0 * has no messages, and always recommends x~ and no transfers.) The other parts of the time line, such as the secret side contracting at time 0, are unchanged.
Specifically, the augmented secret message mechanism works as follows. At time 21, B and s announce nonnegative integers simultaneously. These announcements are also secret and hence unverifiable. There are two cases. Case 1. Suppose someone announces a strictly positive integer at time 21. Then there are no messages and no transfers at time , and the outcome produced in period is x~. That is, they play the null mechanism at time . However, the player who announces the highest integer receives a cash payment from his trading partner at time 21.
15 If the player with the highest integer is B, then s must pay B the amount
That is, the transfer equal to the difference between B's first-best payoff and the payoff from playing the null mechanism. Similarly, if the player with the highest integer is s, then B must pay s the amount
Thus, in case 1, the payoffs will be the same as under the null mechanism, with the time 21 transfers added on. Notice that in this case, side contracting is moot.
Case 2. Suppose both B and s say 0 at time 21. Then the game unfolds just as described in Section G. Thus, at time the secret message mechanism described in Section G is operated. That is, at time , the buyer and the seller make simultaneous announcements of the state, and the outcome is determined according to rules 1 and 2 described in Section G. In this case, the side contracting possibilities at time 0 are nontrivial.
THEOREM 2: The game induced by the augmented secret message mechanism fully implements the first-best outcome in perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
We prove this theorem by proving two claims. Claim 1. There exists a PBE of the game induced by the augmented secret message mechanism, where the outcome is first best.
PROOF OF CLAIM 1:
The equilibrium strategies specify that both B and s say 0 at time 21. After both have said 0, the equilibrium strategies are isomorphic to those described in Section 15 Ties are broken arbitrarily, say in favor of B.
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If some player should say anything else than 0 at time 21, then they play a continuation equilibrium induced by the null mechanism. In this continuation equilibrium, B's expected payoff is B~ plus whatever transfer is received at time 21, and s's expected payoff is s~ plus whatever transfer is received at time 21. 2 , respectively, by announcing a high integer at time 21. Therefore, in any PBE, the payoffs must be at least this high. They cannot be strictly greater, since the third party never pays. Thus, in all PBE, the payoffs must be at the first-best level. This proves Claim 2.
16
II. Moral Hazard in Teams
A team consists of two agents, B and s. At time 1, B and s choose effort levels b $ 0 and s $ 0, respectively. Neither agent observes the other agent's effort. However, the team's total output x [ R is publicly observable. Output is a deterministic function of effort, x 5 x 1b, s 2. For simplicity there is no stochastic shock (it could easily be added). Assume x 1b, s 2 is increasing, concave, and differentiable. The two main differences, compared to Section I, is the unobservability of b and s, and the fact that the verifiable outcome x is a function of b and s (in Section I, x was a real action implemented by the original judge).
Each agent is risk neutral. B's cost of effort is w B 1b 2 , and s's cost of effort is w s 1s 2. Each w i is increasing, differentiable, and strictly convex, and w i 102 5 0. The firstbest action profile is 1b * , s * 2 ; arg max 5x 1b, s 2 2 w B 1b 2 2 w s 1s 2 6. 1 b, s 2 $ 0 16 Our result would go through if the integer game is played out between time 0 and time 1. Indeed, Claim 2 goes through because B and s can refuse to sign all side contracts and announce a high integer between time 0 and time 1, and guarantee themselves B * 1t B * 2 and s * 1t s * 2 , respectively. To prove Claim 1, we construct an optimal PBE as follows. At time 0, no side contract is proposed. If the players have not joined any coalition at time 0, they both announce 0 in the integer game and then play as described in Section G. There is no incentive to trigger the integer game. If a side contract is offered, say to B, for it to be accepted it must give B more than B 1t B * 2 and, for it to be offered, it must give T more than 0. If the integer game is not triggered, this is impossible (see the proof of Theorem 1). But if the integer game is triggered, the coalition of B and T can generate at most a payoff of B 1t B * 2 and this cannot make them both strictly better off. Hence, Claim 1 also goes through.
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AEJ: Microeconomics payment that agent i [ c receives when messages m c are sent at time 4, and x is the team output. Finally, at time 5, there is no scope for renegotiation because the budget is balanced and there is no real decision to be made.
An effort profile 1b, s 2 is (weakly) implementable if there is an original mechanism G 0 such that the induced game g 1G 0 2 has a PBE where the effort levels are 1b, s 2. Since effort is unobserved, intuition suggests that the message game at time is redundant. This intuition is incorrect, however. To see this, we first consider implementation without message games (m B 5 m s 5 m T 5 ~). We will show that in this case the third party plays no useful role. This generalizes Eswaran and Kotwal's (1984) result in a way reminiscent of footnote 20 in Hart and Moore (1988) .
THEOREM : If we restrict attention to original contracts without messages, then introducing a third party does not expand the set of implementable effort profiles.
To prove the theorem, suppose there is a third party T, and the effort profile 1b , ŝ2 is implemented by G 0 without messages. We show that 1b , ŝ2 can also be implemented without a third party. There are two cases depending on whether or not a side contract is in force in equilibrium.
Case 1: The PBE of g 1G 0 2 which implements 1b , ŝ2 is such that, in equilibrium, a side contract is in force. To be specific, suppose coalition c 5 5B, T 6 forms with side contract 5G c 1x2 6 x[R .
Notice that s will maximize his payoff only if, for all s9 $ 0, (15) t s 1x 1b , ŝ2 2 2 w s 1ŝ2 $ t s 1x 1b , s92 2 2 w s 1s92.
If B rejects T's proposal, his payoff is sure to be m ; max 5t B 1x 1b, ŝ2 2 2 w B 1b 2 6.
Indeed, s does not observe the side contract, hence his choice of ŝ is independent of it. Since B will accept any proposal that gives him more than m, in fact, B's equilibrium payoff must be exactly m. The third party's equilibrium payoff must then be (16) t B 1x 1b , ŝ2 2 1 t T 1x 1b , ŝ2 2 2 w B 1b 2 2 m.
t B 1x 1b , ŝ2 2 1 t T 1x 1b , ŝ2 2 2 w B 1b 2 $ t B 1x 1b9 , ŝ2 2 1 t T 1x 1b9 , ŝ2 2 2 w B 1b92.
PROOF OF CLAIM 1:
Suppose there is b9 $ 0 such that (17) (15) and (17) imply that this new mechanism implements 1b , ŝ2 , so, if case 1 applies, then the third party is useless.
Case 2: The PBE of g 1G 0 2 which implements 1b , ŝ2 is such that, in equilibrium, no side contract is in force.
In this case, the proof of Claim 1 goes through, so for any b9 $ 0, (17) must hold. But then, just as in case 1, we can get rid of the third party. This completes the proof of Theorem .
Theorem implies that, if the original contract does not include a message game, then the first best is unattainable, even if a third party is available. We now show that an original mechanism with a message game can implement the first best, as long as a third party is available. This particular mechanism, G 0 , will be called the whistleblowing mechanism. In this mechanism, only T sends a message at time , with message space m T 5 5~, b, s6. Message ~ is interpreted as "stay quiet," b is interpreted as "blow the whistle on agent B," and s is interpreted as "blow the whistle on agent s." The message is observed by B and s but not by outsiders.
Recall that 1t B expect that the third party will blow the whistle on them if they try to side contract with him, side contracting will be deterred. They will only want to accept the third party's proposal if the side contract can deter whistle blowing. Conversely, side contracting is prevented if every side contract induces a continuation equilibrium with whistle-blowing.
THEOREM 4: we can choose F . 0, so that the game g 1G 0 2 has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium which implements the first-best outcome.
To prove the theorem, a PBE which implements the first-best outcome is constructed as follows. At time 0, T's strategy specifies that no side contract is proposed. At time 1, any agent who has not signed a side contract sets effort at the first-best level. At time , T stays quiet if no side contract is in force.
Notice that the third party cannot effect the outcome by blowing the whistle on either agent as long as x 5 x 1b * , s * 2 (by Rule 1). At time 1, Rules 1 and 4 imply that both agents want to choose the first-best actions, anticipating that a deviation will lead to the entire output being given to the third party. From this it follows that, if there is no side contract in force at time 0, then the proposed strategies are sequentially rational from time 1 on. The outcome is first-best by construction.
It remains to specify behavior after a time 0 deviation, where T proposes a side contract. To support the equilibrium, such a deviation should not be profitable. To be specific, suppose T makes a proposal to B (the argument is similar for a proposal to s). We construct the strategies so that if B accepts and coalition c 5 5B, T 6 forms, then either B or T will get no more than their equilibrium payoff. If T gets no more than zero, it is certainly not profitable for him to propose the coalition. If B gets no more than B * from joining the coalition, then we stipulate that his equilibrium strategy is to reject the proposal, and this behavior is certainly sequentially rational. Knowing that B will reject, it is again not profitable for T to make the proposal.
So suppose B accepts the proposal. The coalition c 5 5B, T 6 forms and a set of side-contracting mechanisms 5G c 1x2 6 x[x is in force. s is unaware of a deviation and will play as described above, i.e., his effort is s * . The equilibrium strategies need to specify how the coalition of B and T will behave in g 1G 0 2 following the deviation. Moreover, strategies should be such that either B gets less than B * , or T gets less than 0. Also, we specify, if possible, that T and B believe that s chose the effort s 5 s * at time 1. In addition, if possible, T infers B's effort from the joint output, assuming s 5 s * . In other cases, i.e., if x is inconsistent with s 5 s * , then we may leave the beliefs unspecified.
For a given x, the message game in the side contract cannot be used to (uniquely) extract truthful information about whether or not T blew the whistle in G 0 . This argument is the same as in Section G. Since T's message in G 0 only changes the transfers, the strategic incentives in the side-contracting mechanism G c 1x2 do not depend on it. That is, whistle-blowing does not induce any "preference reversal" at time 4. Hence, the side contract G c 1x2 cannot be designed to (uniquely) extract information about whether or not T blew the whistle at time . By assumption, the side contract must induce some continuation equilibrium (T is not allowed to propose a badly behaved
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AEJ: Microeconomics contract that causes an existence problem). By the payoff-irrelevance argument, we may assume the continuation equilibrium strategies are such that the messages sent at time 4 by B and T only depend on x, not on whether or not T blew the whistle at time .
At time , we specify that T blows the whistle on B. As F . 0, this is sequentially rational for T.
Under this specification, if the coalition c 5 5B, T 6 forms, either Rule 1 or Rule 2 will apply at time . In either case, if F is large enough, s will not get less than his equilibrium payoff s * . But then, at least one of the members of the coalition is not made strictly better off. As argued above, this implies that T does not gain by making the proposal. This completes the proof of Theorem 4.
The key to the equilibrium construction is the third party's behavior at time . He stays quiet at time if no side contract is in force. But if he belongs to a coalition, then he blows the whistle on the other member of the coalition. In order to be assured of a profitable deviation, the agents should design a side contract where whistleblowing is punished, and therefore not attractive to T, in all continuation equilibria. However, this is impossible because blowing the whistle only triggers a monetary reward which is not "payoff relevant" at time 4. Thus, all side contracts must have a continuation equilibrium where whistle-blowing is not punished, and in such a continuation equilibrium, the third party may as well blow the whistle. We support the optimal PBE of g 1G 0 2 by selecting the "whistle-blowing continuation equilibrium" whenever a coalition is formed. As before, full implementation of the first-best can be achieved by augmenting the mechanism.
III. Concluding Comments
The theory of mechanism design studies the question: given some desirable outcome, does there exist a mechanism (contract) which implements it? If information is complete, the answer is often yes, although the optimal contract is typically quite complex (see Maskin and Sjöström 200) . However, there is one case where even implementation with complete information is quite difficult. That is, when there are only two agents and they can renegotiate inefficient outcomes (Maskin and Moore 1999) . This case is emphasized in contract theory. If a third party is added, then the problem of renegotiation is less severe, but collusion may be a problem. The key issue becomes, what variables are contractible for a colluding subcoalition? To address this issue, a natural starting point is a symmetry assumption-the grand coalition and all subcoalitions have access to the same contracting technology. The symmetric case is intermediate between the two polar cases of no side contracting and perfect side contracting that have been prominent in the literature.
For collusion to be a problem, the collusive activity (including messages and side payments) must take place behind closed doors. It cannot be verifiable information for the judge who supervises the original contract, otherwise, he could punish the colluders. By symmetry, the original judge should be able to conduct his proceedings behind closed doors. Therefore, messages and cash transfers exchanged under the original contract are not verifiable information for the judge who supervises 
